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9.  
The Repatriation of Japanese POWs and the Early Cold War in East Asia 
Frank Jacob 
The Cold War was, as scholars Liu Hong and Michael Szonyi correctly called it, a “battle 
for the hearts and minds”  of millions of people around the globe. In East Asia, this battle 1
was particularly fierce, especially when the Chinese Civil War ended with the victory of 
Mao Zedong’s (1893-1976) communists. The Cold War was very intense on its 
peripheries,  where proxy wars divided newly-established nation states and where the 2
superpowers supported different national factions to draw into or to keep a whole region 
within their zone of influence. Immanuel Wallerstein was therefore right when he argued 
that the Cold War in Asia was anything but “cold.”  The global conflict, nevertheless, was 3
not only a war on land and on sea, but one fought in the imaginations of the people as 
well.  Both superpowers were eager to emphasize their own successes as a result of their 4
“ideological” systems, i.e. of communism or Western liberalism. One group in particular 
that was the subject of debates and with regard to whom there were struggles in the case 
of early Cold War Japan were the Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) that remained in the 
Soviet Union in the years after the end of the Second World War. While the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), 
wanted to get them back to Japan as fast as possible, the Soviet influence on these men 
was also considered a menace with regard to the occupation of Japan, because a mass of 
communist veterans could pose a threat against the integration of the island country into 
the Western Bloc. MacArthur, who “defined his role from the start as that of a sort of latter-
day shogun, aloof from the masses of ordinary Japanese,”  was of course aware of the 5
possible threat to his rule, especially since he was also being reminded about the danger 
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of Japanese communism by press reports in the United States. However, since “a 
professional soldier was given the post of civil administrator in Japan,”  who tended to 6
“impose democracy like a dictator,”  MacArthur addressed the issue of the communist 7
threat to his position by conducting a red purge in 1949/50. The present chapter will 
elaborate on the role of Japanese POWs imprisoned in the Soviet Union during the early 
Cold War and the repatriation of these veterans to Japan, and it will embed their history 
into the ideological conflict between the US occupation forces there and the possible 
menace of a rise of communism in the East Asian country. As a first step, MacArthur’s rule 
in Japan and its character shall be discussed, before the struggle between the SCAP and 
the Soviet authorities over the fate of the Japanese POWs in the Soviet Union is taken into 
closer consideration. The image of Japan’s veterans, however, was twofold, which is why a 
further step will analyze how the fears of a communist menace represented by the POWs 
were perceived and addressed by the occupational government. The chapter 
consequently provides a deeper insight into the problems related to the role of former 
POWs and veterans in post-war societies in general, and to the question of the abuse of 
former POWs and veterans with regard to political conflicts in particular. 
MacArthur’s Japan 
Douglas MacArthur, who would determine the fate of Japan during the occupational 
period, staged his rule from the first moment on, and he may have thought that he had 
been chosen by fate to rule the former enemy country.  As Allied Supreme Commander, 8
South-West Pacific Area (SWPA), MacArthur had demanded the leading role in the Pacific 
theater of the Second World War early on and thereby made enemies due to his 
“overarching ego.”  The conservative US general ordered the British not to accept any 9
partial surrender from Tokyo, as he wanted to receive the offer of unconditional surrender 
personally. Due to this behavior, many British POWs suffered for much longer in the hands 
of the Japanese.  Once the war was over, MacArthur also wanted to be the first on 10
Japan’s soil, and he ultimately landed at Atsugi airbase even before the Marines or the US 
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Navy could set foot on the ground. On 30 August 1945, a C54 named Bataan landed at 
Atsugi, allowing MacArthur to reach the land he was supposed to rule in the years to 
come.  On his way to the New Grand Hotel in Yokohama, the general and his officers 11
were guarded by Japanese soldiers, who had turned their backs towards the street, which 
was obviously partly because they needed to protect MacArthur in case some hardliners 
had not accepted the end of the war.  MacArthur, who never underestimated the 12
Japanese enemy after the fall of the Philippines,  was still careful in 1944, as, for the US 13
general, a Japanese attack towards the south could still be likely to happen;  however, by 14
August 1945, he “had dismissed [any] danger from his mind”  and, in an act of “absolute 15
foolhardiness,”  he symbolically took possession of Japan almost alone.  16 17
Although MacArthur’s strategy seemed to pay off, it was not certain if Japan could simply 
be occupied without causing large numbers of casualties due to possible guerilla warfare 
by the remaining Japanese forces. The Americans had encountered what it meant to fight 
until the last man against the Imperial Japanese Army on Iwo Jima and Okinawa,  which 18
is why the prospects for mainland Japan were not too optimistic; some American 
observers were assuming that the Asian “country would blaze with a permanent flame of 
hatred for the conquering Americans.”  In Potsdam in July 1945, the Allied Powers had 19
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already decided that Japan would be occupied after the end of the war,  and the State-20
War-Navy-Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) had already begun to plan the details of the 
occupation, which MacArthur would later simply adopt and sell as his own.  In addition, 21
there was an internal US discussion about Japan’s future: while the so-called China crowd 
demanded a harsh peace for the enemy, the destruction of the economic conglomerates, 
i.e. the zaibatsu, and a “complete purge of the ruling class,”  the Japan crowd, led by 22
Joseph Grew (1880-1965), who was a former ambassador to Japan and served as director 
of the Office for Far Eastern Affairs in the later years of the war, demanded that the enemy 
country should be rebuilt without its traditional values and ideas being destroyed. The two 
factions also struggled over the future role of Emperor Hirohito (1901-1989), yet in the end 
neither of the two groups were really able to interfere with MacArthur’s own agenda, 
especially since the general “viewed with suspicion men who had a special knowledge of 
Japan and the Far East.”  23
The Allied plan for the invasion of Japan, called “Downfall,” was based on “a gargantuan 
blow against the islands of Kyushu and Honshu,”  and the first wave of landings, called 24
“Olympic” and “Coronet,” would start on 1 December 1945 and 1 March 1946 respectively. 
MacArthur was sure to possess air control, and as he declared on 20 April 1945, “[t]he 
Japanese Air Force has been reduced to a line of action which involves unco-ordinated, 
suicidal attacks against our forces, employing all types of planes, including trainers.”  25
Events, however, went in a different direction, and after the use of the first atomic bombs 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the occupation of Japan was decided upon on 
11 August, and “[t]he immediate objectives were the early introduction of occupying forces 
into major strategic areas, the control of critical ports, port facilities, and airfields, and the 
demobilization and disarmament of enemy troops.”  Hirohito was eventually willing to 26
accept the demands of Potsdam and, as the Tokyo Nippon Times reported on 9 
September 1945, he was “also prepared to issue his commands to all the military, naval, 
and air authorities of Japan and all the forces under their control wherever located to 
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cease active operations, to surrender arms, and to issue such orders as may be required 
by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces for the execution of the above-mentioned 
terms.”  Regardless of this declaration to cooperate, there were doubts about the 27
Japanese attitude towards the occupying forces, especially since the Emperor of Japan 
had also issued the following warning on 15 August 1945: “Beware most strictly of any 
outburst of emotion which may engender needless complications, and refrain from 
fraternal contention and strife which may create confusion, lead y[ou] astray and cause 
y[ou] to lose the confidence of the world.”  28
MacArthur, on the other hand, thanked God when he received the Japanese acceptance of 
the terms for surrender: “I thank a merciful God that this mighty struggle is about to end. I 
shall at once take steps to stop hostilities and further bloodshed. The magnificent men and 
women who have fought so nobly to victory can now return to their homes in due course 
and resume their civil pursuits. They have been good soldiers in the war. May they be 
equally good citizens in peace.”  The SCAP was ready to begin the occupation of Japan, 29
although “[t]he American elements, outnumbered by thousands to one, were landing in a 
hostile country where huge numbers of enemy soldiers still had access to their arms.”  30
The occupation plan was consequently first and foremost based on the assumption that 
Hirohito would be able to control his people successfully. Signs that this was not the case, 
like the kamikaze pilots who released pamphlets over Tokyo demanding resistance against 
the decision of the Emperor and his advisors,  were simply ignored. 31
Regardless of the danger, the occupation of Japan began peacefully, and why will forever 
remain some kind of mystery. Historian Kazuo Kawai therefore correctly called the events 
a “happy surprise” for both the occupiers and the occupied.  The Japanese “lost no time 32
mourning over their failure” and realized that it might have been wiser to cooperate with 
the American forces than to sabotage them.  Due to these considerations and the lack of 33
a broader resistance against his person or policies, MacArthur, as the Japanese historian 
Masuda Hiroshi remarked, “probably saw himself as a second Perry, charged with the 
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opening of Japan.”  On board the USS Missouri, the American general attended the 34
official capitulation ceremony on 2 September 1945. At this moment, he represented the 
ultimate power that would determine the further fate of Japan, and MacArthur would do 
that without any doubt: “Because his world was Asia, it was the most important.”  In the 35
years of the occupation, he would leave Japan only twice, once for the Philippines in 1946 
and once for Korea in 1948.  Historian Theodore Cohen therefore correctly remarked, in 36
relation to the first years of the occupation, that “MacArthur bestrode the land like a 
Colossus, and the Japanese called him ‘father.’”  Residing on the 8th floor of the Dai-Ichi 37
Building in Tokyo, he would rule like a shōgun, backed by his officers, the so-called Bataan 
Boys, who were absolutely loyal to him.   38
Not everybody was allowed to meet with the new ruler of Japan, who received fan mail 
from many different countries but was reluctant to greet visitors in person, and when 
visitors were granted an audience they “were enraptured not only by what he said, but how 
he was saying it, and the fact that he was saying anything at all.”  When MacArthur met 39
Hirohito for the first time, “[t]he Emperor bowed deeper than ever,” and the general is 
reported to have said the following after the meeting: “I could have humiliated him, publicly 
exposed him, but what for? I fought the war; he ended it. He deserves respect, the 
magnanimous gesture a noble defeated enemy deserves. Besides, with him as 
figurehead, our job is so much more easy.”  It was clear that Hirohito no longer dominated 40
the Japanese state. MacArthur had replaced him by defeating the Japanese Army and 
leading the occupational forces. His leadership role therefore eventually became the “most 
natural thing in the world.”  Besides Hirohito, the Japanese Prime Minister and Foreign 41
Minister, and some other high politicians, the SCAP did not meet with many Japanese,  42
yet the common people in Japan “saw the Occupation personified in his image.”  The 43
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person of MacArthur filled a power vacuum that had appeared by the end of the war due to 
the fall from power of the military and supposedly the Emperor. From the first moment on, 
the US general made it clear that he had replaced the former authorities and that his claim 
to rule was absolute. His first proclamation to the Japanese people emphasizes this 
demand: 
The unconditional surrender of the Imperial Japanese Government to the Allied 
Powers has brought to an end the armed conflict which has long existed between 
these forces. By the terms of the Instrument of Surrender, signed by command of and 
behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese 
General Headquarters, the victorious military forces under my command will today 
occupy the territory of Japan. […] 
I hereby establish military control over all of Japan. […] 
Article I 
All powers […] will henceforth be exercised under my authority. […] 
Article III 
All persons will obey promptly all my orders and orders issued under my authority. 
Acts of resistance […] will be punished severely. […] 
Article VII 
Further proclamations, ordinances, regulations, notices, directives and enactments 
will be issued by me or under my authority, and will specify what is required of you 
and what you are forbidden to do.  44
In his second proclamation, MacArthur made clear that violations against his rule would be 
severely punished: “ANY PERSON WHO: Violates the provisions of the Instrument of the 
Surrender, or any proclamation, order, or directive given under the authority of the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers […] [shall] suffer death or such other 
punishment as the Court may determine.”  MacArthur had therefore established a 45
monopoly of violence for the occupational forces, and used similar measures to restrict 
foreign financial transactions.  46
The occupation of Japan was “nominally an Allied enterprise,”  but officially turned into an 47
exclusive American business run by one man only, namely the US shōgun. And what a 
shōgun MacArthur was: “By the course he followed, he left his stamp on the Japanese 
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bureaucracy, the Emperor institution, the feudal aristocracy, the Diet, the family, religion, 
freedom, disarmament, education, the legal system, farm tenancy, labor.”  While many 48
officers worked on the measures taken by the occupational forces, MacArthur throned 
above them and would make suggestions, which were usually interpreted as demands 
rather than friendly advice. He pushed for five main reforms: 
1. Women’s suffrage, 
2. The establishment of unions, 
3. The liberalization of education, 
4. The abolishment of repressive (political) institutions, and 
5. The democratization of the Japanese economy.  49
To achieve these aims, MacArthur needed the support of the Japanese government, which 
showed a high level of continuity, allowing many former supporters of the war to stay in 
their seats as long as they were willing to obey the Americans’ demands.  The Far 50
Eastern Commission (FEC) and the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) supposedly ruled the 
country, but the final decision was always made by MacArthur and his close officers, 
although after spring 1946 “[t]he flood of directives to the Japanese had become so 
immense that I doubt if anyone could have kept track of all of them.”  The American 51
shōgun had to deal with many different issues at the same time. 
One of these issues was the future role and position of the Emperor. Could he continue in 
his role within Japanese society, or should he be indicted as a war criminal? Only the 
communists requested the latter option, but with no more than 3.8% of the votes in the first 
election, it was rather unlikely that their voices could gain sufficient political weight.  With 52
regard to this issue, MacArthur’s influence became very obvious, as he kept Hirohito in 
order to secure a successful occupation by avoiding public resistance. He ensured the 
Emperor avoided trial and wanted to use him to reform the country, starting with Hirohito 
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acting as a constitutional monarch.  Due to the above-mentioned meeting, the power 53
relationship between the two was determined, and in retrospect it was considered to have 
been “a meeting of different kinds of gods, nothing less.”  MacArthur had realized then 54
that “[t]he survival of the emperorship would be a potential asset of great utility, as an 
instrument not only for promoting domestic stability, but also for bringing about changes 
desired by the United Nations in Japanese policy.”  For MacArthur, the eventual success 55
of the occupation was closely related to the continuation of Emperor Hirohito’s rule, and he 
argued that he would need fewer occupation forces if the Emperor remained in his role.   56
The prospect of needing more than one million soldiers in Japan was too frightening and 
politically dangerous for many people in Washington, which is why MacArthur could secure 
the fulfillment of his wishes. Hirohito remained as Emperor and was not brought to trial as 
a war criminal. MacArthur’s strategy, on the other hand, was successful, and he could 
reduce the occupying forces from 435,000 in December 1945 to 200,000 in 1946.  In the 57
meantime, the Japanese monarchy got involved in the modernization process of the 
country and the radicalization of the military could be prevented.  As well as the role of the 58
Emperor, MacArthur also had to deal with the Japanese constitution; this was a very 
serious issue, as a strong constitution could prevent Japan from another radicalization 
such as the one it had been going through since the late 1920s.  
Japan would be converted into a democratic society based on a revised constitution.  59
This revision was one of the major aims of MacArthur.  It took the SCAP office only nine 60
days to draft this new constitution, and the draft would serve the Japanese government as 
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a guideline.  It was elementary for the Americans to place power in the hands of the 61
people, meaning that the Emperor was supposed to lose his political influence. When this 
first draft was put in front of “Japanese eyes in 1946, it detonated one bombshell after 
another.”  Despite being threatened with the total abolishment of the imperial house, the 62
Japanese representatives complied, and it was announced on 6 March 1946. Japan’s 
negotiators, among them Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1967), had realized that 
the Americans had “very definite ideas concerning the policy to be pursued in the 
Occupation.”  For the Japanese, the process was also too fast, and Yoshida later wrote in 63
his memoirs about this: “the general feeling in Government circles was that a change of 
such importance should be brought about with all requisite and proper care and study; or 
in other words that undue haste in the matter was not only unnecessary, but clearly to be 
avoided.”  The time aspect was particularly concerning, especially since “the GHQ draft 64
was of a revolutionary nature”  and the tremendous changes that were supposed to be 65
implemented with the snap of a finger went far beyond everything the Japanese could 
have thought of at this time. It was only the pressure on the imperial house and the threat 
of bringing Hirohito to trial as a war criminal that eventually did the trick for MacArthur, who 
did not hesitate for a second in playing this card to get what he wanted.   66
While Japan was supposed to turn into a peaceful country, the Japanese themselves saw 
no reason to abolish the Meiji Constitution.  The political transformation, as requested by 67
the SCAP, caused some unease on the Japanese side.  This was, however, also related 68
to misunderstandings with regard to the language used on both sides.  Article 9 in 69
particular was nevertheless important for the future of Japan as it demilitarized the country. 
MacArthur later claimed that the proposal for this article came from Prime Minister 
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Shidehara Kijūrō (1872-1951), but the SCAP documents provide no proof for this.  70
Despite the new constitution, the political arena in Japan remained unstable, with different 
coalitions ruling between 1946 and 1952.  Regardless of the changing cabinets, 71
MacArthur was eager to fulfill the demands he had set up for the transformation of Japan.  
Emancipation was another issue for the US general, and Time Magazine spoke of the 
social revolution Japan was currently being transformed by on 9 May 1949.  MacArthur 72
represented an enlightened position with regard to female emancipation and 
recommended, even requested, “[e]qual rights in marriage, access to divorce, ending of 
arranged marriages, voting rights, and participation in public affairs and in the 
workplace.”  As well as women’s rights, the SCAP also granted more rights to workers. 73
Labor unions were no longer prohibited, and the number of their members grew up to six 
million in the first two years after the war. Land reforms were initiated at the same time to 
prevent a radicalization of the peasants, as such a development had been held 
responsible for the communists’ success during the Chinese Civil War.  The zaibatsu 74
were supposedly destroyed, but many of the structures continued to exist unofficially. 
Eventually, stability in Japan was more important than reforms, which is why the old 
cliques would continue to determine the economic structure of the country. The initial work 
of the Holding Company Liquidation Commission between 1946 and 1948  was later 75
redefined by the necessities of the Cold War, and no longer by the idealistic aims of the 
SCAP from the first hour of the occupation. 
The same can be said for the old political elites. While Operation Blacklist was prepared by 
MacArthur long before he actually reached Japan, on 6 September 1945 the US general 
authorized a purge against 210,000 individuals in politics, administration, economy, and 
the media.  The first wave of the purge hit Japan as a “major shock” on 4 January 1946, 76
 McNelly, The Origins, 106 and 120.70
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especially since the “Japanese had no particular desire to prosecute and judge those who 
were, or might have been, responsible for our miseries.”  Regardless of these initial 77
attempts to purge the old elites, eventually, MacArthur needed them to rebuild Japan due 
to the necessities of the Cold War and, in contrast to Nazi Germany, interest in the 
Japanese case had no strong lobby outside of Asia.  Regardless of his specific position 78
towards the American aims, MacArthur often just did what he wanted, and the support of 
the media empire of William Randolph Hearst made the general uncontestable.  When 79
mistakes had been identified, the latter would just point the finger at his staff, considering 
himself to be inerrant. The Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) that had to prove all news 
before it was allowed to appear in Japan had a simple agenda: “Nothing could be printed 
which was derogatory to the United States, even though it originated in the United 
States.”  And in Japan, the United States meant Douglas MacArthur. His rule was 80
uncontestable, but there was one issue the SCAP had to deal with more carefully and with 
a twofold strategy. The issue of Japanese POWs who needed to be repatriated was not 
only logistically but also politically a problem of a high caliber. This question, related to the 
post-war order of Japan, led to a severe political conflict with the Soviet Union, but at the 
same time created the fear of a politically indoctrinated fifth column of communism on 
Japanese soil. The issue must therefore be taken into closer consideration, especially 
since it provides valuable information about the role veterans can play within post-war 
societies, and how they are perceived by these societies as well.  
The Problem of Japanese POWs in the Soviet Union 
According to the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945, “[t]he Japanese Military Forces, 
after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the 
opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.”  Between 500,000 and 750,000 81
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Japanese soldiers were taken prisoner by the Soviet Union and brought to labor camps, 
where they had to work for the Soviet state in the aftermath of the war.  MacArthur had 82
“instituted a program for the repatriation of many millions of Japanese from areas 
abroad,”  and most of the Japanese soldiers who had been stationed abroad could have 83
been brought back to Japan until 1947. In contrast to the British authorities in Southeast 
Asia and the Chinese government, whose representatives had been interested in a fast 
repatriation, the “Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, […] many months after the 
repatriation of Japanese from other areas had been completed, still held several hundreds 
of thousands of Japanese in detainment.”  More than 350,000 soldiers had not been 84
repatriated, and the other members of the Allied Council for Japan were demanding 
answers about the whereabouts and the health status of these POWs. The Soviet Union 
and its representative in the council had “at no time provided […] any information 
whatsoever with respect to the number of Japanese held, their names or location, or any 
form of vital statistics by which we might know the number who have died by disease, 
undernourishment, exposure, or maltreatment.”  To avoid answering questions that would 85
demand clear answers that might have caused unease for the Soviets, their representative 
regularly stayed away from meetings that would discuss such issues. The chairman pro 
tempore of the Allied Council, Cloyce K. Huston, therefore declared on 15 February 1950: 
I feel impelled to note, however, before proceeding to today’s business, that we have 
seen the SOVIET MEMBER walk out of this Council chamber, with his staff, at three 
previous meetings when the question of Japanese repatriation was under discussion, 
and today is the second meeting from which he appears deliberately to have 
absented himself. Although the work of the Council will, of course, proceed as usual 
in the absence of the SOVIET MEMBER, it is difficult to understand how, if he refuses 
to attend the meetings of the Council or to participate in the conduct of the Council’s 
business, he can find it possible to consider himself to be fulfilling the functions for 
which he is assigned to this headquarters.  86
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It seemed clear from the beginning of the work of the Allied Council that the Soviet Union 
had no serious intentions of repatriating the Japanese POWs as soon as possible, but 
instead would abuse them as a form of cheap labor in different parts of its territory. From 
the 8th meeting of the Allied Council for Japan on 26 June 1946, the topic kept appearing 
on the agenda. On 29 October 1947, the topic was for the first time discussed with Major 
General Kislenko, who represented the Soviet Union, and “[a]t that meeting, for the first 
time, the magnitude of the problem, its implications, and its impact upon the social and 
political aspects of the situation in Japan were fully explored.”  It was also argued at that 87
meeting “that the implementation by the Soviet authorities of the Repatriation Agreement 
of 19 December 1946, was spasmodic, delayed by excuses, and partly nullified by devious 
unilateral interpretations.”  In short, the Soviet Union was unwilling to repatriate its 88
Japanese POWs. In the meantime rumors appeared, claiming that the death rate among 
the latter had reached 20-30%. The issue regularly reappeared, but the Soviet Union was 
neither represented nor fulfilling any requests. It therefore not only ignored existent 
agreements with regard to the work of the Allied Council for Japan, but also violated 
international law, e.g. the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1949.  
The chair of the council, William J. Sebald (1901-1980), therefore made a statement to the 
Soviet Union in the meeting of the Allied Council on 10 May 1950 and noted that  
fundamental principles of international law accepted by most of the nations of the 
world and recognized as such by the Soviet Union through its own advocacy in at 
least two recent instances, has  [sic!] clearly been violated. If I were to attempt to 
draw up even a partial bill of particulars with respect to the conduct of the Soviet 
Union in connection with the repatriation and treatment of Japanese prisoners of war 
and other internees held in Soviet-controlled areas, as a minimum, I would include 
the following: 
1. Failure to provide an accounting of any kind with respect to prisoners of war and 
civilians incarcerated by the Soviet authorities; 
2. Failure to report the death of any Japanese subject while in Soviet custody; 
3. Failure to comply with the provision of the Potsdam Declaration […] 
4. Failure to comply with the spirit and letter of the Repatriation Agreement entered 
into with the SUPREME COMMANDER on December 19, 1946; 
5. Failure to provide for means of exchange of information with respect to prisoners 
of war; 
6. A callous disregard for human life by its failure in numerous cases to provide even 
the minimum facilities to sustain human beings; 
7. Disregard and violation of fundamental international law as set forth in the 
International Conventions of 1899, 1907, 1929, and 1949; 
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8. The use of prisoners of war for political purposes through the process of political 
indoctrination.  89
The Soviet member of the Allied Council was directly addressed by this criticism, and it 
was highlighted how he had “steadfastly refused to carry his share of the burden by his 
failure to offer constructive assistance or advice regarding this subject.”  The Soviet Union 90
remained adamant and did not respond to these accusations at all. Even a direct letter 
from Sebald to Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko (1904-1954) on 29 April 1950 
did not cause any reaction.  It remained unclear what had happened to the more than 91
350,000 Japanese soldiers who had not yet been repatriated. The Japanese House of 
Representatives passed a resolution on 2 May 1950, which emphasized the fact that 
“today, after the lapse of almost five years since the end of the war, there still remain in the 
Soviet Union and in the areas under Soviet influence […] more than 300,000 Japanese 
whose fate is unknown.”  Mothers and fathers, husbands and wives, siblings and children, 92
all were waiting for a reply from the Soviet Union to gain knowledge about the 
whereabouts of their loved ones. Due to the lack of the Soviet response, the members of 
the House of Representatives argued 
the whole people of Japan have been deeply pained in heart and mind. Representing 
this feeling of our people, by means of this resolution taken by this House, this House 
is resolved to request the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to appeal to 
the justice and public opinion of the world through the United Nations Organization 
and to afford every possible assistance for bringing about the early settlement of this 
question and especially for his highest consideration with regard to the realization of 
the following: 
1. That all our nationals still remaining in the Soviet Union and in the areas under 
Soviet influence […] be repatriated as early as possible. 
2. That it be arranged to announce the names of those among the internees in the 
Soviet Union and the areas under Soviet influence who have died, who have 
been associated with war crimes, who are serving sentence and who are 
detained for illness. 
3. That it be arranged for an investigation team of the United Nations or neutral or 
humanitarian body to investigate in the Soviet Union and in the areas under 
Soviet control the situation of life and death of our interned nationals.  93
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The Allied Council had been provided with relatively detailed numbers about those who 
were serving in the regions occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of the war, and the 
members were wondering if the Soviet Union had ever cared enough about the Japanese 
POWs to collect information about them in the first place, and was now only covering up 
that so many had died while being held captive in Stalin’s Gulag system.  General Ho 94
Shai-lai (1906-1998), the representative for China in the council, who “had some 
experience in the repatriation of Japanese war prisoners and nationals from China,” 
highlighted that the Chinese “government’s handling of the Japanese repatriates was done 
efficiently and without any feeling of enmity or bitterness.”  All fingers were pointing 95
towards the Soviet Union, demanding answers and an explanation.  
In 1949/50, close to 100,000 Japanese were eventually repatriated, in addition to the 
350,000 who had reached their homes since the end of the war from the Soviet Union, but 
there was also a problem with those veterans who had made their way back to Japan. 
The Menace of Communist Veterans  
Professor Thomas George, who had written a “Summary of the Communist World 
Strategy” for the SCAP, made it clear that Asia would be the most decisive region in the 
Cold War. With more than one billion people there, “Asia is the real center of the world, the 
real center of the coming world.”  The professor underlined the value of human beings 96
with regard to labor and the constructive as well as destructive potential of human beings. 
According to his evaluation, “[t]he greatest human potential [was] in Asia, and thus who 
ha[d] Asia, w[ould] finally have the world.”  In another report on the basic strategy against 97
communism, the academic advisor warned the SCAP directly: 
If Asia is lost to Communism, the United States are indefendable. A mortal blow of 
the World Communism against the United States will never come from Europe 
through Great Britain, but from Asia to Alaska, through the very backdoor of the 
United States, through the indefendable Canada, mountaneous West coast, ideal 
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places for the locusts of paratroopers, of guerilla partisans, followed by the swarming 
communist red armies of Asia.   98
The eventual loss of China to the communists under Mao’s leadership was shocking for 
the US and intensified the fears of a communist menace in Japan as well. The veterans 
arriving from mainland Asia were consequently considered particularly problematic, and 
that even before China had been lost.  
A “Special Report” on the veterans repatriated from Soviet Territory dealt with the danger 
of communist indoctrination as well.  It was reported that the demobilization of the 99
Japanese Army, under the control of GHQ, the Eighth Army, and the US Navy, proceeded 
without interruption, especially since the Japanese Demobilization Board cooperated 
without hesitation.  Nevertheless, it also highlighted “[t]he repatriated demobilized soldier 100
as a social problem. Already communism is stretching its claws at the disillusioned, 
defeated millions of soldiers, sailors and airmen.”  The possible communist indoctrination 101
of the veterans, especially in the Soviet Union, was considered a severe problem, 
especially since the occupation force, counting approximately 59,000 men in December 
1946 in addition to the 84,000 men of the Japanese police, seemed insufficient to control 
73 million Japanese in the case of a communist-driven uprising, especially since 5 million 
of these people were demobilized soldiers. These veterans could pose a serious threat to 
the US’ control of Japan. The veterans, it was argued, “once led into the path of 
Communism, will permeate and influence the rest of these vast millions, and instantly 
create serious problems for the Occupation Forces in the maintenance of public order.”  102
In response to this menace, the “Special Report” provided the following considerations: 
i - The repatriated ex-soldier, disillusioned, jobless, is an easy prey to subversive 
ideas, especially communism. 
ii - The rapid inroads already made by communism in the labor unions of Japan, 
presage the infiltration into repatriate groups. 
iii - The brilliantly efficient demobilization machinery, in the past, has been a “cushion” 
for repatriated, jobless, millions. 
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iv - The repatriated ex-soldier must be controlled. The demobilized millions must be 
influenced in thoughts and actions in order to remain tranquil within the purviews of 
our occupation.  103
Measures were therefore recommended to address the danger of the veterans’ communist 
indoctrination abroad. The former soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army themselves, 
however, were not considered as willing agents of communism, but as its victims. The 
veterans were just “vulnerable to communism, to exploitation by those who seek to 
discredit a stable government and create chaos,” which is why the SCAP and his forces 
had to take counter-measures early on: 
The employment, under our direct control, of former officers in the demobilization 
process is the only method by which we can hope to influence and control, indirectly 
and without publicity, the actions, thoughts, and philosophy of former members of the 
Japanese armed forces, and guide them into proper, conservative, law-abiding 
attitudes and channels.  104
Communist indoctrination itself was a consequence of the foreign imprisonment of the 
soldiers, especially in the Soviet Union, where the communists had  
launched an elaborate plan designed to propagandize and subvert them. The 
enslaved army was rendered leaderless through the culling out and segregation of 
senior officers, and by the creation of a schism between officers and enlisted men. 
Then the Soviets disposed of the recalcitrants, the weak, and the aged, leaving a 
compliant youthful group. Dissident elements among the captives were welded into a 
firm core of Soviet-protagonists and were used as “stooges” to whip the mass of 
internees into line. Prisoners were subjected constantly to a barrage of propaganda, 
buttressed by Soviet-directed newspapers and formalized indoctrination.  105
Having returned to Japan, the veterans would then, according to reports, be approached 
by the Japanese Communist Party, whose members would try to enlist the former soldiers 
into the ranks of the party. Poisoned with communist propaganda and struggling with the 
post-war economic order in Japan, the veterans were easy prey for the communist enemy, 




 To CoS and C-in-C, Brief, GHQ FECOM, February 2, 1949: Jap[anese] Repatriates From Soviet Territory: 105
Communist Indoctrination. General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General 
Staff, Civil Intelligence Section: Special Report, Jap[anese] Repatriated from Societ Territory, Communist 
Indoctrination, MAMA, RG 6, B. 17, F. 5.
According to information received by some of the 2,500 repatriates who arrived in Japan 
on 21 January 1950, it was obvious that thousands of Japanese POWs were still being 
held captive in Soviet camps, while “among them are perhaps several thousands who are 
either awaiting trial on so-called war crimes charges, or who have already been 
sentenced, and strangely enough, these sentences usually amount to 25 years.”  As well 106
as these accusations, the POWs, according to the named reports, were also under steady 
pressure from indoctrination by communist propaganda. The Allied Council discussed 
these statements in its meeting on 1 March 1950, when its chair William J. Sebald referred 
to these reports to highlight the Soviet strategy towards the Japanese POWs.  The 107
repatriates had provided 44 affidavits that all give evidence of the “systematic program of 
political indoctrination being carried out by the authorities of the Soviet Union in an effort to 
convert Japanese prisoners of war to communism.”  According to the witness reports by 108
Matsu Shigeto, Yoshimoto Ryoi, and Koybayashi Shoichi, “the Red Army at Camp No. 9 in 
District 99 (Karaganda) told a group of Japanese prisoners of war that Secretary General 
KYUICHI TOKUDA of the Japan Communist Party had written a request to Soviet 
authorities to detain all ‘reactionary’ Japanese prisoners of war in the Soviet Union and to 
repatriate only those prisoners of war who have accepted communism.”  The Soviet 109
Union had therefore considered the Japanese POWs as a political tool in the early phase 
of the Cold War. First and foremost, Stalin wanted to exploit their labor force, especially for 
the construction of the Baikal-Amur Line, a parallel track to the Transsiberian Railway in 
the south. Furthermore, if they had to be repatriated, they should be so as communists, 
providing allies within the borderlands of the Cold War in East Asia, i.e. Japan.  
There, MacArthur had to deal with a growing fear of communist influence, which was not 
just related to the veterans, especially after the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950. 
Japan was now declared essential to the US strategy in East Asia,  and the communist 110
menace there needed to be addressed more actively. In 1949/50, a red purge was 
consequently initiated by MacArthur, due to which employees who were considered to be 
pro-communist in the Japanese administration, economy, universities, and schools lost 
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their jobs.  With regard to the veterans, their return to their homes aroused suspicion by 111
the US authorities about their ideological conditioning, their possible anti-American 
feelings, and their dealings with Japan’s surrender and the rise of communism in Asia 
alike. They were veterans now, yet they also had to find their way within their new society 
as Japan wanted to look forward instead of being reminded of the past. 
Conclusion 
The case of Japanese veterans repatriated from the Soviet Union after the end of the 
Second World War shows how the fates of the former soldiers and POWs were embedded 
into the global and transnational conflict of the Cold War. Their history with regard to their 
imprisonment in the Soviet labor camps raised some red flags for the ruling authorities in 
Japan, who not only feared the military potential of the Japanese veterans but also their 
political indoctrination by the ideological aims of communism. The men who returned home 
consequently must have felt ostracized. The causes they had gone to war for were no 
longer valuable; for many, the burden of having survived and not died with honor must 
have been problematic enough. Yet in the new political order of the Cold War in East Asia, 
the veterans were not only a menace, they were also a tool with which the finger could be 
pointed at the Soviet Union, which was depicted as an evil traitor against the new 
international order in the meetings of the Allied Council for Japan. All in all, neither of the 
two superpowers really cared for the veterans once they could no longer be used as 
strategic assets within the new conflict. Once they had returned to Japan and had been 
cleared of their possible communist identity, they would be forgotten rather quickly, forced 
to find their own ways back into a society that did not want to be reminded of the war or of 
the related crimes of the past.  112
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